662 635 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some had been executed.

652 662 Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials, both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time . In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 555 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily upon mercenary troops, who were recruted from all possible peoples and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

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endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[6]

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system.

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority

* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

T. 871 555 [191] S.U. 871 563 555 of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek, Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

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T. [517] The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan, which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

Ka. 101

## *I. KAZAKHSTAN*

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

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